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CONFINING CULTURAL EXPRESSION: 
HOW THE HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 
BEHIND MODERN COPYRIGHT LAW 
PERPETUATE CULTURAL EXCLUSION 
APRIL M. HATHCOCK 
Copyright law is the primary means by which society preserves and 
protects valued cultural heritage. There is a clear correlation between that 
which is protected and that which is valued by society for the continued 
enjoyment of future generations. However, this truth becomes troubling 
when it is considered that modern copyright continues to espouse 
antiquated ideals of acceptable cultural production, to the exclusion of the 
cultural property of many historically marginalized people groups. This 
article takes a critical look at copyright law to deconstruct the ways in 
which historical values and assumptions continue to color the modern 
protection of cultural creation, thereby confining cultural expression and 
barring protection to the cultural work of the marginalized. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“In the end, we will conserve only what we love. We will love only what 
we understand.” – Baba Dioum 
 
Nowhere in the legal world do these words ring more true than in the 
area of copyright.  Providing ownership rights in the cultural creations of 
society helps to ensure their preservation and survival for generations to 
come.  However, when the very basis for those rights is predicated on 
antiquated values that exclude certain groups and types of cultural creation, 
then we run the risk of creating a narrowed view of what culture is and how 
it is reflected in the things we produce.  Copyright was not—and is not—
explicitly concerned with who could produce cultural creations and who 
could not, though the implications of copyright protection affect the 
opportunities of different groups for cultural production.  A legal regime 
that confines protection to the particular creative endeavors of a particular 
group of people excludes the valuable contributions of those on the outside.  
Though these exclusions may be unintentional, they are just as harmful as 
if they had been expressly written into the law. 
This article takes a critical look at modern copyright law in light of the 
values and conceptions highlighted in its early development.  From its 
initial emergence as a means of protecting rights in the written word to the 
rise of the author as a vital hero to the creation of cultural works, copyright 
continues to espouse certain assumptions and value judgments about 
cultural creation.  By examining these assumptions and values through a 
critical lens, with the aid of critical race, feminist, and queer theory in 
particular, I aim to expose the ways in which these assumptions continue to 
work to the exclusion of the creative works of already marginalized groups 
of people.  As one critical legal scholar has already noted, “[I]ntellectual 
property law contributes to determining and maintaining a pervasive set of 
power relationships in society.”
1
  It is essential that we critique those 
relationships and deconstruct the ways in which they imbue this area of the 
law. 
II.  BIRTH OF COPYRIGHT AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AUTHOR 
From its very inception into the canon of legal thought, copyright has 
                                                          
 1.  Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 185 (2007). 
2
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dealt primarily with the protection of the cultural creations of literate, 
white, heterosexual males, and this focus continues to color copyright law 
today.  From the first copyright legislation arising out of the early 18th 
century to the succeeding rise of the Romantic author, the value principles 
behind providing ownership rights in cultural work have been rooted in the 
protection of a certain clearly defined cultural creator and his creation. 
A.  Cultural Control and the Statute of Anne 
The British Statute of Anne of 1710 emerged in the midst of political, 
social, and religious upheaval as the very first formal existence of 
copyright legislation and served a key function in providing control of the 
majority over cultural output.
2
  The statute was created to provide 
protection to authors who were discovering increasing instances of 
illegitimate printing and copying of their work.
3
  The printed word had long 
since emerged from the sole province of clerics and religious leaders to 
become more accessible to the average person, and printing presses and 




Thus, the Statue of Anne provided for ownership rights to attach to 
published written material to permit authors to control the dissemination 
and distribution of their work: 
Whereas printers Booksellers and other persons have of late frequently 
taken the liberty of printing reprinting and publishing or causing to be 
printed reprinted and published Books and other writings without the 
consent of the authors or proprietors of such books and writings . . . [may 
it be enacted that] the Author of any Book or books already printed who 
hath not transferred to any other the copy or copies of such Book or 
Books share or shares thereof or the Bookseller or Booksellers printer or 
printers or other person or persons who hath or have purchased or 
acquired the copy or copies of any Book or Books in order to print or 
                                                          
 2.  See Shelly Wright, A Feminist Exploration of the Legal Protection of Art, 7 
CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 59, 67 (1994) (describing the use of copyright limitations as a 
means of controlling the distribution of literary and artistic works); Paul Gleason, 
Copyright and Electronic Publishing: Background and Recent Developments, in 
PUBLISHING AND THE LAW 5, 7 (A. Bruce Strauch ed., 2001) (describing the use of 
copyright as a means to control public discourse). 
 3.  Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19 (Eng.), in Primary Sources on Copyright 
(1450-1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, eds., 2014), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/anne_1710.asp. 
 4.  See Wright, supra note 2, at 67 (noting that copyright did not arise until “the 
commercial development of printing in 15th century Europe made the economic 
potential of cultural exploitation feasible”); Gleason, supra note 2 (noting that “both 
secular and religious leaders” began regulating printing upon the invention of the 
printing press). 
3
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reprint the same shall have the sole right and liberty of printing such 
Book and Books . . .
5
 
There were two main ways in which the Statute of Anne functioned as a 
mechanism for controlling cultural creation and dissemination.  For one, 
there were clear ties between the creation of ownership rights in written 
work and the Lockean theory of property rights that had been articulated 
just two decades before.
6
  Authors were imbued by God with the natural 
resources, i.e. talents, ability, to create written work through their labor.  
They, therefore, had a divine ownership right in the fruits of that labor, i.e. 
the published, written text:
7
 
For such an author, everything in the world must be made available and 
accessible as an ‘idea’ that can be transformed into his ‘expression,’ 
which thus becomes his ‘work.’  Through his labor, he makes these 




This divine ownership right naturally excluded those not blessed with the 
divine mandate to “subdue the earth.”
9 
 Property ownership only existed for 
the literate, white, heterosexual male; therefore, copyright only existed for 
that select group.  Those who did not have recognized ownership rights in 
property did not enjoy the parallel rights in copyright. 
The second way in which copyright law controlled the creation and 
dissemination of cultural property was through controlling the avenues of 
distribution.  By limiting the ability of popular presses to reproduce and 
distribute written texts, the government was able to control the flow of 
information and the development of knowledge.
10
  The Statute of Anne 
frames this control positively as an “encouragement of learned men to 
                                                          
 5.  Statute of Anne, supra note 3 (emphasis added). 
 6.  See Wright, supra note 2, at 68 (describing the tie between John Locke’s 
theory of labor and the promotion of ownership rights in published writing); see also 
John Locke, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT ¶¶ 25-51, at 133-146 (Thomas I. Cook 
ed., Hafner Press 1947) (1689). 
 7.  See Locke, supra note 6, ¶ 32, at 136-37 (“God, when he gave the world in 
common to all mankind, commanded man also to labor, and the penury of his condition 
required it of him. God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth, i.e., 
improve it for the benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it that was his 
own, his labour. He that in obedience to this command of God subdued, tilled, and 
sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his property, which 
another had no title to, nor could without injury take from him.”).  
 8.  ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 211 
(1998). 
 9.  See Locke, supra note 7, ¶ 32, at 136 (“God and his reason commanded him to 
subdue the earth,” referring to Genesis 1:28 of the Bible).  
 10.  See Wright, supra note 2, at 67; Gleason, supra note 2, at 7. 
4
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compose and write useful books,”
11
 but the function was much more 
restrictive.  The definition of “useful books” resided with the government 
charged with enforcing copyright law and enabled the monarchy to prevent 
the dissemination of what could be considered seditious or heretical texts.
12
  
Thus, the very nature of cultural property was shaped by the majority rule 
through the function of early copyright law. 
B.  Rise of the Romantic Author 
With the focus on the written word as a means of cultural exchange and 
the development of ownership rights in written text for authors, it is no 
wonder that the 18th and 19th centuries saw the rise of the author as a 
central figure in cultural creation.
13
  Prior to this time, authors figured very 
little, if at all, in the importance of written text.
14
  It was the text itself that 
carried weight in the realm of cultural relevance.  However, as the 
argument arose for ownership rights in the tangible mental labors of 
authors, the function of the author himself experienced a shift and began to 
take center stage.
15
  No longer were the literate merely concerned with 
reading a particular text; they had begun to read the works of particular 
authors, which carried new cultural importance.  One did not just read the 
poems of William Wordsworth; one read Wordsworth himself.
16
  One did 
not study the political philosophy of John Brand; one read Brand. 
                                                          
 11.  Statute of Anne, supra note 3. 
 12.  See Wright, supra note 2, at 67; Gleason, supra note 2, at 7. 
 13.  See Debora Halbert, Feminist Interpretations of Intellectual Property, 14 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 431, 447 (2006) (“During the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, the idea of the author underwent a transformation. The focus shifted from the 
text to the author as original genius and authority of the work.”); Wright, supra note 2, 
at 73 (“The individual as ‘creator’ or ‘author’ in the aesthetic sense did not reach full 
fruition until the late 18th century.”); Malla Pollack, Towards a Feminist Theory of the 
Public Domain, or Rejecting the Gendered Scope of United States Copyrightable and 
Patentable Subject Matter, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 603, 606 (2006) 
(explaining the importance of the author as to the early development of copyright). 
 14.  See Halbert, supra note 13, at 447 (“It was not uncommon for early texts to be 
published anonymously, either to avoid attribution of controversial political ideas, or 
because authorship was not seen as essential to the text.”); Wright, supra note 2, at 73, 
80-81 (describing the relative unimportance of the author/artist until beginning in the 
14th and 15th centuries and culminating in the 19th century). 
 15.  Halbert, supra note 13, at 448; see also Pollack, supra note 13 (describing the 
rise of the author as the “fantasy hero of early copyright”); Wright, supra note 2, at 73 
(noting that the rise in the importance of the author/artistic was accompanied by 
increased recognition of the author/artist’s economic interest in his work). 
 16.  For an interesting examination of Wordsworth’s own view of the Romantic 
author, see KEMBREW MCLEOD, OWNING CULTURE: AUTHORSHIP, OWNERSHIP, AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 24-25 (2001). 
5
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In this way, the very identity of the author became tightly enmeshed with 
his written creation.
17
  The development of copyright law progressed as a 
means to protect the rights of the prototypical author in the creation of his 
vital cultural work.  As Debora Halbert writes in her article providing a 
feminist interpretation of intellectual property, “Arguments regarding the 
author as the creator of original works manifesting a unique personality 
were made to justify copyright ownership.”
18
  Thus, the prevalent 
conception of the prototypical author became the mold by which all 
cultural creation was judged.  This Romantic notion of the author displayed 
particular characteristics that shaped thought on cultural creation and 
guided the early development of copyright law.  In particular, the epitome 
of the Romantic author was a heterosexual, paternalistic male, focused on 
individual creation. 
1.  Author as Male 
Unquestionably, one of the primary characteristics of the Romantic 
author was his gender.  While fiction novel-writing was largely considered 
a feminine pursuit prior to the development of copyright law, by the 18th 
century, all published writing, including that of fiction, had become a male-
dominated form of cultural expression.
19
  Women were still permitted to 
engage in writing as part of their private interactions and for their 
amusement, but the realm of public writing belonged entirely to men.  As 
Halbert notes, “‘Literature’ was established as a male domain; great works 
of literature were not written by women.”
20
  While women were permitted 
to engage in private writing to pass the time, writing of any cultural 
significance was reserved entirely for men. 
Moreover, the exclusion of women from the arena of true literature did 
not simply extend to women as authors.  It also encompassed the exclusion 
of women as consumers of the written word and those who wrote for a 
female audience.  This opinion was widely shared among those considered 
the great literary geniuses of the time, including Samuel Coleridge: 
Coleridge found it important to create distinctions between authentic 
authors, like himself, and those who were tainted by the company of 
women.  In making these distinctions, Coleridge sought to criticize those 
                                                          
 17.  See Wright, supra note 2, at 77 (“Creation became a productive process 
closely identified with an author.”) 
 18.  Halbert, supra note 13, at 448. 
 19.  See id. at 449 (describing the concern about the prior “feminization” of 
literature as men took on greater roles in fiction-writing during the 18th and 19th 
centuries); Wright, supra note 3, at 82 (describing the overall “masculinization” of 
novel-writing during the 18th and 19th centuries). 
 20.  Halbert, supra note 13, at 450. 
6
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol25/iss3/1
HATHCOCK 03/22/2017 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2017  8:20 PM 
2017] CONFINING CULTURAL EXPRESSION 245 
aspects of literary culture he did not consider of appropriate artistic 
content, primarily texts whose predominant audience (and often authors) 
were women.  The distinctions created between the authentic and 
inauthentic authorship premised upon the romantic notion . . . was 




Thus, writing of true literary merit had to be created for and by men.  
The all-important published text as cultural object could only gain 
significance from the masculine touch.
22
 
It is important to note the privilege of male authorship at the time did not 
entirely preclude the rise of female authors.  Shelley Wright notes, 
“Looking back at this period it is possible to rank such female authors as 
Jane Austen herself, the Bronte sisters, Elizabeth Gaskell, and George Eliot 
as equal or even superior to such male authors as Sir Walter Scott, Dickens, 
Thackeray, Trollope, or Wilkie Collins.”
23
  Nonetheless, many of these 
authors were not known or celebrated until long after their deaths, and even 
those who did achieve recognition during their lifetimes often did so by 




Even if some females wrote and even published, it was still questionable 
the rights they had under a copyright regime predicated on existing 
property rights and the concept of the author as male.  Copyright infused 
tangible property ownership rights into the realm of intangible ideas.
25
  
That being the case, the gendered norms of property ownership naturally 
transferred to the new rights created under copyright law.  Married women 
were expressly prohibited from owning tangible property during the 18th 
and 19th centuries, and at best, their ownership in copyright was woefully 
                                                          
 21.  Id. at 449. 
 22.  Male privilege in cultural creation also extended to other art forms at the time, 
including artists in the fine arts. While women were permitted to create art, to paint, 
sculpt, and the like, they were not taken seriously and not permitted into the canon of 
“high art.” As with writing, women were permitted to engage in artistic pursuits for 
their private amusement, but the realm of cultural creation remained entirely in the 
capable hands of men. See WHITNEY CHADWICK, WOMEN, ART, AND SOCIETY 9-11 (5th 
ed. 2012) (discussing the gendered notions of art that have permeated art history and 
artistic creation). 
 23.  Wright, supra note 2, at 83. 
 24.  See id. at 83-84. 
 25.  See EDWARD W. PLOMAN & L. CLARK HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1 (1980) (describing copyright as a means of 
“linking the world of ideas to the world of commerce”); Wright, supra note 2, at 66 
(“[I]ntellectual property law created, within European cultures, a peculiar collection of 
rights in the intangible nature of human creation.”). 
7
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unclear.
26
  The same could also be said for those who were non-white.  
Ownership of property was a privilege reserved for white men, and this 
same principle of property ownership infused the creation of copyright law.  
The only way to ensure complete ownership in one’s written work was to 
be a white male. 
2.  Author as Father 
The second characteristic of the Romantic author that colored the 
development of copyright law was that of the author as the heterosexual 
father.  As the importance of the author as a central figure to the creation of 
a written text emerged, so too did the importance of identifying the 
“paternity” of a written text.
27
  Cultural creation was an act of mental 
reproduction, an intangible, almost spiritual, analogue to the process of 
physical reproduction.
28
  He fathered his written work using a feminine 
vessel, i.e., a Muse, and exposed it to the world, just as he fathered his 
children, in particular his sons, upon his wife and set them loose to take 
over the world long after he was gone.  In essence, the Romantic author 
was seen as the paternal lord over all his written domain, just as he was the 
lord of his wife, children, and lands: 
This paternal construct is also similar to the position of the bourgeois 
family, a political arrangement in which all economic rights inhered in 
and flowed towards the father.  All family property, including all 
property of the wife and children, belonged to the husband/father for him 
to exploit as he saw fit . . . Even the persons of wife and children were 
themselves “property” completely under the control of the patriarchal 
head of the household.
29
 
In this way, the author/father assumed proprietary authority over his 
creation and was responsible for ensuring not only its initial existence but 
its subsistence and distribution in the world. 
A prime example of this patriarchal imperative can be seen in the right of 
reproduction, a stick in the bundle of copyright that has been recognized 
from the beginning.  The Statute of Anne was created primarily as a means 
of protecting an author’s right of reproduction from the illegal usurpation 
                                                          
 26.  See Wright, supra note 2, at 65-66 (describing the ambiguous ways in which 
English courts addressed women’s intellectual property rights). 
 27.  See id. at 79-80 (discussing the rights of paternity in authorship as they 
emerged in copyright law); MCLEOD, supra note 16, at 22 (discussing the longstanding 
“paternity metaphor” used in relation to creative work). 
 28.  See Pollack, supra note 13, at 606-07 (comparing physical birth with the birth 
of ideas into copyrightable works); Wright, supra note 2, at 76-77 (comparing physical 
reproduction with the reproduction of copyrighted works). 
 29.  Wright, supra note 2, at 78. 
8
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of printers and booksellers.
30
  Likewise, copyright law in France developed 
out of the French Revolution as a means to protect authors’ rights to 
reproduce their own work.
31
  The prerogative of the author/father to both 
create and reproduce his work was a mainstay of early copyright law: 
“[F]rom the beginnings of copyright protection the major concern has been 
to prevent the production and dissemination of works already owned by 
someone else, i.e. illegitimate copies.”
32
  Just as the bourgeois father 
protected his estate and family legacy from the infringing presence of 
illegitimate offspring, so too the author/father protected his written work 
from the presence of illegitimate reproductions.
33
  Moreover, this concept 
of author as father was deeply ingrained in the creative minds of the time. 
Daniel Defoe wrote in 1710 that “A Book is the Author’s Property, ‘tis the 
Child of his Inventions, the Brat of his Brain; if he sells his property, it then 
becomes the Right of the Purchaser; if not, ‘tis as much his own as his Wife 
and Children are his own.”
34
 
As father to his literary creations, the Romantic author was charged with 
taking care of his work.  He did so by relying on copyright law to protect 
his proprietary interests in his written creation. 
3.  Author as Individual 
Another characteristic of the Romantic author that has affected copyright 
is the conception of the author as an autonomous cultural creator.  The 
construct of the author as individual arose from the prevailing theories of 
property ownership of the time that were centered on the concept of the 
individual owner of private property as distinct from the community.
35
  
Working as a “solitary male genius,” the prototypical author created 
cultural property—in the guise of written text—which was based on public 
observations and destined for public consumption but created apart from 
                                                          
 30.  See Statute of Anne, supra note 3. 
 31.  See Jane Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in 
Revolutionary France and America, 64 TULANE L. REV. 991, 1014-21 (1990) 
(describing how litigation based on the French copyright laws of 1791-93 turned 
primarily on a recognition of the author’s reproduction right). 
 32.  Wright, supra note 2, at 77. 
 33.  See id. at 78-80 (highlighting the comparisons between an author’s relationship 
to his work and the bourgeois father’s relationship to his children). 
 34.  MCLEOD, supra note 16, at 22 (quoting Daniel Defoe). 
 35.  See Locke supra note 6, at 134; see also Wright, supra note 2, at 68 (exploring 
the ties between Locke’s theory of property and the author as individual owner of his 
creation); MCLEOD, supra note 16, at 20-21 (discussing the influence of the Lockean 
theory of property ownership on the concept of the author as individual); COOMBE, 
supra note 8, at 219 (describing how the author comes to own his work as an individual 
through the application of his labor). 
9
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societal interference.
36
  Ever the rational individual, he gathered his 
observations and impressions of the world around him, he co-opted the 
ideas swirling through the community, and worked independently to give 
meaning to those observations and ideas by setting them to paper.
37
  The 
community that served as the basis and the receptor of his work mattered 
little in the face of the autonomous author. 
In this environment obsessed with individual achievement, copyright law 
developed as a means to protect the ownership rights of the autonomous 
author: 
The existing definition of copyright as both economic and personal 
within a political or civil context presupposes that individuals live in 
isolation from one another, that the individual is an autonomous unit who 
creates artistic works and sells them, or permits their sale by others, 
while ignoring the individual’s relationship with others within [his] 
community, family, ethnic group, religion . . . Society itself is seen as an 
aggregate of anomic individuals, each separate, segregated, fragmented, 
and existing only as subjects of circumscribed civil rights.
38
 
While the community was meant to enjoy the knowledge flowing from 
an author’s work, the idea that written text, or any cultural creation, could 
be the product of multiple creators was both foreign and undesirable.
39
  To 
the extent that a written creation was the work of multiple authors, it was 
evaluated in light of the individual contributions of each author.
40
  Because 
the identity of the author was central to the work itself and because 
individualism and autonomy were central to identity, there was no room for 
cultural creations that encompassed the shared identities of multiple 
creators.  For works of joint authorship, each author contributed a bit of his 
identity, as typified by his work, in a discrete manner that helped to make 
up the whole.  All the while, however, the individual identities of the 
                                                          
 36.  See Wright, supra note 2, at 62 (describing the “solitary male genius, isolated 
both spatially and temporally from his community and the background of the art in 
which he works”); Pollack, supra note 13, at 606 (describing the Romantic author as an 
“autonomous individual who creates without support from his cultural network”). 
 37.  See COOMBE, supra note 8, at 211 (“In these constructions of authorship, the 
writer is represented in Romantic terms as an autonomous individual . . . For such an 
author, everything in the world must be made available and accessible as an ‘idea’ that 
can be transformed into his ‘expression,’ which thus becomes his ‘work.’”). 
 38.  Wright, supra note 2, at 73-74. 
 39.  See Burk, supra note 1, at 188 (describing collaborative work at the time as “a 
rare anomaly”). 
 40.  See id. (noting that a joint author has to provide an independent contribution to 
the original work); Pollack, supra note 13, at 616 (noting that joint authors “are still 
authors because of their individual contributions”); see also, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 
201(a) (2012) (outlining the requirements for joint authorship in the U.S.). 
10
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multiple creator-contributors remained intact.  The act of cultural creation 
was ultimately the realm of the author as individual and could not and did 
not reside in the communal sphere. 
4.  Author as God 
Each of the major characteristics of the Romantic author—the author as 
male, as father, and as individual—carried deep monotheistic undertones in 
keeping with the prevailing Protestant religious sentiments of 18th and 19th 
century Europe.  The prototypical author, like God, rose above and existed 
beyond the masses to breathe life into his creation without the need for any 
sort of outside influence.
41
  Like the Protestant God, he was a male father 
with deep patriarchal authority over his creation, controlling both how it 
came into being and how it was used upon its dissemination.
42
  His ideas 
arose out of the formless void and were given life in the act of putting pen 
to paper and sending that paper out into the world.
43
  Indeed, the act of 
creation took place in a realm deeply rooted in the written word.  As related 
in the creation story of the Gospel of John, the Romantic author’s work of 
cultural production began and ended with the written word: “In the 
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was 
God.”
44
  The creation, this written word, was closely linked to the author/
creator, fully imbued with his unique identity and closely held under his 
omnipotent authority.  Copyright law, growing out of a cultural tradition 
that valued the cultural creator as a god-like being rooted in written text, 
carried the values of this tradition from its inception into the present day. 
III.  MODERN COPYRIGHT AND CULTURAL EXCLUSION 
In many ways, modern copyright hardly differs from the copyright 
protection that first emerged in the early 17th century in response to the 
growing figure of the prototypical Romantic author.  The focus of early 
copyright law continues to shape how the law functions and is applied 
today.  Even though copyright has since expanded to include non-written 
forms of expression, including the visual and performing arts, it still 
focuses on the importance written word.  This historical focus, carried into 
                                                          
 41.  See Wright, supra note 2, at 62 (describing the “solitary male genius, isolated 
both spatially and temporally from his community and the background of the art in 
which he works”). 
 42.  See id. at 79-80 (discussing the rights of paternity in authorship as they 
emerged in copyright law); MCLEOD, supra note 16, at 22 (discussing the longstanding 
“paternity metaphor” used in relation to creative work). 
 43.  See COOMBE, supra note 8, at 215 (detailing the process by which the 
Romantic author gave form to ideas and made them his own). 
 44.  John 1:1 (KJV). 
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the modern world, continues to color the values inherent in copyright 
protection and the production and distribution of cultural material.  Those 
works that do not fit neatly into the mold of published written works by the 
male, heterosexual, god-like figure do not receive the same amount of 
protection, and therefore value, as those works that do.  Modern copyright 
law continues to promote the value judgments of worthy cultural 
production first established in its infancy, to the exclusion of the cultural 
creations of other, minority groups. 
A.  Focus on the Published, Written Word 
The early focus on the published, written word persists in the 
development and function of modern copyright law.  Born out the realm of 
Western cultural values, the insistence on the inviolability of the written 
word represents a clear preference for the published text as the valid form 
of cultural production.  In fact, the very language of copyright law reflects 
a focus on the written word over other forms of cultural creation.  Derived 
from the Latin word cōpia, meaning “abundance,” the term became 
synonymous during the 15th century with “transcript” in recognition of the 
development and widespread use of the printing press.
45
  Today, the word 
“copy” still signifies, inter alia, “matter to be printed.”
46
  The very term 
used to refer to the rights a creator has in his cultural creation refers 
directly to the rights in the “copy,” i.e., the right a creator has over his 
printed matter. 
Emphasis on written cultural production is also evidenced in the 
application of modern copyright law.  In some jurisdictions, the law 
requires that a cultural expression be fixed in a physical form in order for 
copyright protection to apply.
47
  In other words, there is a preference for 
work that exists in the same context as the published, written word—
cultural products that have been printed, or fixed, in a physical medium that 
ensures their dissemination and inclusion in the generally accepted 
collection of cultural heritage.  Under the Berne Convention, the treaty by 
which the largely European concept of copyright has been extended 
throughout the world,
48
 fixation is not required for the protection of a work; 
however, the treaty does allow for individual states to enact fixation 
                                                          
 45.  See OXFORD ENGLISH REFERENCE DICTIONARY 317 (2nd ed. 2002). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, 
c. 48, § 3(2) (U.K.). 
 48.  See Burk, supra note 1, at 187 (“The systems of intellectual property law 
developed by Western industrialized societies . . ., by virtue of aggressive treaty 
propagation, now extend to most jurisdictions in the world.”). 
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requirements before a work can receive copyright protection.
49
   
Interestingly, the fixation requirement is most prevalent in common law 
countries, like the U.S. and the U.K., where copyright as a legal right first 
developed.
50
  In the U.S., a work must be “fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression, now known or later developed” to qualify for copyright 
protection.
51
  In the U.K., the fixation requirement is expressed negatively, 
denoting the circumstances under which copyright protection does not 
apply: “Copyright does not subsist in a literary, dramatic or musical work 
unless and until it is recorded, in writing or otherwise.”
52
  With such clear 
statutory preferences for the cultural creation in printed form, the cultural 
products of many minority groups fall through the cracks of copyright 
protection. 
This continued focus on the published, written word as the only true 
means of cultural creation results in the exclusion of cultural production of 
many non-white, non-Western groups for whom literacy is not a priority 
when it comes to the creation of cultural heritage.  Cultural production that 
focuses on non-fixed forms of expression, such as folklore, oral histories, 
and shared rituals, are largely excluded from modern copyright protection, 
particularly in nations that first developed copyrights.
53
  In her survey of 
national copyright legislation, Agnès Lucas-Schloetter found that the 
                                                          
 49.  See Berne Convention for the Protection for Literary and Artistic Works art. 
2(2), Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on Jul. 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) (“It shall, however, be a matter for legislation in the countries of 
the Union to prescribe that works in general or any specified categories of works shall 
not be protected unless they have been fixed in some material form.”).  
 50.  See Agnès Lucas-Schloetter, Folklore, in INDIGNENOUS HERITAGE AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 259 (S. von Lewinski ed., 2004) (noting that fixation 
requirements are most prevalent in common law rather than civil law countries). The 
U.K. developed the first copyright law in the Statute of Anne of 1709. PLOMAN & 
HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 12. Copyright law in the U.S. followed shortly after, 
beginning with state legislation in twelve of the thirteen colonies from 1783 to 1786. 
Id. at 14. Federal U.S. copyright law emerged beginning with the drafting of Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution in 1789, followed by the first congressional copyright 
legislation the year after. Id. at 15-16. 
 51.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). This requirement grew out of the constitutional 
charge to Congress to “secur[e] for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. From the beginning, U.S. 
copyright law has focused on protecting the written word, and such focus extends to the 
current copyright statute. 
 52.  Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 3(2) (U.K.) (emphasis 
added). 
 53.  See Lucas-Schloetter, supra note 50, at 291-92 (discussing the fixation 
requirement of common law countries, like the U.S. and the U.K., as a barrier to 
copyright protection for folklore). 
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majority of national laws either did not mention folklore at all or explicitly 
excluded folklore from copyright protection, automatically relegating folk 
traditions to the public domain.
54
  These national legislations came 
predominantly from countries in Europe, as well as the U.S., Canada, and 
Australia.
55
  The exclusion of folk tradition from copyright protection, 
whether expressly or by omission, is based on a preference for the 
published, written word, and unduly bars the cultural products of 
indigenous people groups from the benefits of copyright protection. 
For example, in her article on the importance of collective intellectual 
property rights for indigenous communities, Angela Riley tells the story of 
the Ami people from southern Taiwan and the appropriation of their 
cultural folk music by the famous German group, Enigma, during the 
1990s.
56
  Enigma’s hit song “Return to Innocence” featured a performance 
of the traditionally Ami “Song of Joy,” performed by one of the 
community’s tribal elders.
57
  The song had not been transcribed; rather, it 
was passed down over generations of Ami as part of their cultural 
tradition.
58
  However, the ownership rights for the song now belong to the 
Western music group and its producers because Enigma incorporated it into 
their hit single, taking an ancient Ami cultural tradition and turning it into a 




While the Ami and other indigenous groups, who have suffered similar 
appropriations of their cultural heritage, can learn a lesson from these 
experiences—a new take on the adage “publish or perish”
60
—the option to 
transcribe and publish indigenous cultural creations is not necessarily a 
palatable or even viable one. Riley notes: 
The “fixation” condition of copyright places an immense burden on 
indigenous communities seeking to protect their intellectual property.  
The requirement, by definition, excludes all oral literature of indigenous 
                                                          
 54.  Id. at 284-85. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual 
Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 175, 175-77 
(2000). 
 57.  See id. at 176. 
 58.  See id. 
 59.  See id. at 176-77. 
 60.  “Publish or perish” is a common phrase used in academic circles to refer to the 
imperative that professors publish scholarly works to ensure their welcome to the 
tenured ranks. See generally Eugene Garfield, What is the Primordial Reference for the 
Phrase “Publish or Perish”?, 10 The Scientist 11 (1996). I believe it is of equal value 
in this context, where cultural products risk being lost to copyright protection, unless 
they are published in a fixed, physical form. 
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peoples from the paradigm of Western law.  In order to satisfy this 
standard for copyright protection, indigenous peoples would be forced to 
abandon the method of knowledge transmission that goes to the very 
essence of Native life.  Communicating cultural works from generation 
to generation in a written format is foreign to most indigenous societies, 
many of which have relied for thousands of years on oral tradition as a 
means of documenting history and culture, Oral traditions are the other 
side of the miracle of language; they are older and more universal than 
writing.  The written word isolates, and requires putting spoken language 
into contrived, articulable rules. . . . [T]he written form simply cannot 
capture the nuances of a spoken text.
61
 
Requiring that cultural production be fixed in order to warrant protection 
perpetuates an age-old exclusion of the cultural traditions of non-Western, 
indigenous people groups worldwide. 
In addition to excluding the cultural works of indigenous groups, the 
primacy of the published, written word in modern copyright legislation 
creates an exclusion of women’s traditional, cultural products.  Certain 
creative endeavors, such as knitting, quilting, clothing design, and food 
preparation, have always been, and largely continue to be, associated with 
women’s work.
62
  Unfortunately, these same acts of cultural creation are 
also largely excluded from copyright protection because of the requirement 
that copyrightable works be fixed, which is the modern equivalent of the 
early focus on the published, written word.  Designs for knitted work, 
quilts, and clothing are generally not covered under copyright laws unless 
they are written down or drawn out, like any other traditional literary or 
artistic work.
63
  Creations that are made extemporaneously, without 
patterns or plans, would likely not receive protection unless they contain 
discrete creative elements.
64
  Likewise, rituals and processes associated 
with food preparation are not covered by copyright laws, though a recipe 
for such processes would receive protection once it is written.
65
 
Nevertheless, there are other modes of intellectual property that may 
provide protection for these creative endeavors, such as utility or design 
patents; however, the means of obtaining these protections are laborious, 
time-consuming, and expensive.
66
  Unlike copyrights, they do not attach 
                                                          
 61.  Riley, supra note 56, at 195-96 (internal quotations omitted). 
 62.  See Halbert, supra note 13, at 441-46 (discussing knitting and quilting); 
Pollack, supra note 13, at 607 (discussing food preparation and clothing fabrication). 
 63.  See Halbert, supra note 13, at 441-46; Pollack supra note 13, at 607. 
 64.  See Pollack, supra note 13, at 609-10 (discussing the “useful articles” rule of 
U.S. copyright law, restricting copyright protection to only the highly creative, non-
functional elements of a functional item). 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 608-09. 
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immediately upon the creation of the object.
67
  Thus, many creative works 
typically associated with feminine efforts fall outside of the scope of 
protectable cultural expression because of the persistent focus on the 
published, written creation as the preferred form of cultural production. 
B.  Focus on the Romantic Author 
Modern copyright law also perpetuates the traditional focus on the 
Romantic author and his characteristics.  This author-centric focus can 
readily be seen in the language of the laws themselves.  The Berne 
Convention, which has been ratified by 172 nations,
68
 repeatedly uses the 
words “author” and “authorship” to refer to the creators of protected works, 
regardless of whether those works are written or not.
69
  In the U.S. 
Constitution, copyrights are specifically defined as a means of 
“securing . . . to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings.”
70
  Likewise, American copyright legislation focuses on 
authorship as the basis for copyright protection: “Copyright protection 
subsists . . . in original works of authorship . . .”
71
  In the definitions section 
of the statute, and throughout the statute in its entirety, U.S. copyright law 
refers repeatedly to the “author” or “authors” of a copyrighted work.
72
  In 
fact, in the more than 50 terms defined in the first section of the U.S. 
Copyright Act, the term “author” or “authorship” shows up more than 20 
times, though the term itself is never defined.
73
  The American law assumes 
a knowledge and understanding of authorship and a concomitant 
acceptance of the language of the written word as integral part of copyright 
protection.  The same is true for French copyright law, which is referred to 
as the “droit d’auteur” or “right of the author.”
74
  The Western concept of 
the Romantic author continues to serve as the philosophical and practical 
basis for modern-day copyright law, as evidenced by the legal language 
used. 
Not only the author himself, but particular characteristics of the 
Romantic author appear throughout the terms of modern copyright law, 
                                                          
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works: 
Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. (Jan. 13, 2017), 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/documents/pdf/berne.pdf. 
 69.  See generally Berne Convention, supra note 49. 
 70.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
 71.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 72.  See generally, Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2012). 
 73.  See id. § 101. 
 74.  See generally Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle, [C.P.I] [Intellectual Property 
Code] article L121-1-9,  L122-1 -12 (Fr.). 
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including the conception of the author as individual, as father, and as god-
like creator.  The author as individual is readily apparent in the copyright 
terms governing joint authorship and works created by multiple creators.  
Modern copyright law, as in the early days, envisions authorship as an 
activity primarily reserved for the autonomous individual, distinct from 
group influence.  Joint authors are still treated as individuals, even as their 
collective contributions make up the whole of the work.  Each author 
wholly possesses the rights to the work, based on their ability to be 
distinctly identified.
75
  Moreover, determinations of the extent of copyright 
ownership rely heavily on the knowledge of each author’s identity.  In the 
U.K. and France, for instance, copyright duration is calculated based on the 
death date of the last known surviving author, emphasizing the importance 
of the authors’ individual identities.
76
  Moreover, joint authorship, while 
possible, is often complex and not readily navigable.  Joint authors in the 
U.S. are not permitted to file online, must pay higher fees for registration, 
and must wait nearly twice as long for processing.
77
  Additionally, the 
authors must be individually identified by their full name and the nature of 
their contribution to the work, described in detail.
78
  Thus, even with works 
of joint authorship, identification of the author as individual is key in 
modern copyright law. 
Modern copyright law also emphasizes the perspective of the author as 
father.  The right of reproduction, so important to the development of early 
copyright law, continues to play a major role in the rights accorded to 
authors under the modern legal regime.  Almost all copyright legislation 
explicitly lists the right of reproduction as one of the primary rights 
belonging to the author of a work.
79
  There is also a strong persistence of 
the paternity metaphor of creative production that existed in the early days 
                                                          
 75.  See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (“The authors of a joint work are co-owners of 
copyright in the work.”); Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 88 (U.K.) 
(describing how the rights of joint authors are held separately by each individual 
author); C.P.I. art. L113-3 (Fr.) (“Collaborative work is the common property of the 
coauthors.”) (translated by author); Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), ss 78-83 (Austl.) 
(describing how the rights of joint authors are held separately by each individual 
author). 
 76.  See Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 12(4) (U.K.); C.P.I. 
art. L123-2 (Fr.); see also Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s 80 (Austl.). 
 77.  See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE ECO REGISTRATION SYSTEM, 
http://copyright.gov/eco (last visited May 8, 2017). 
 78.  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FORM TX (2012), 
http://copyright.gov/forms/formtx.pdf. 
 79.  See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106(1); Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, 
§ 16(1)(a) (U.K.); C.P.I. art. L122-1 (Fr.); Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s 31(1)(a)(i) 
(Austl.). 
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of copyright.  In France, “[t]he title of author belongs, absent proof to the 
contrary, to the one or to those under whose name the work has been 
disclosed.”
80
  Here, the creative work, like a newborn child, claims its 
paternity from the one who has given it his name, “absent proof to the 
contrary” that could arise from a “paternity test” of sorts, revealing the 
work to be that of a different author/father.  The paternity of a creative 
work also arises in the emphasis on moral rights found in many of today’s 
copyright regimes.
81
  Moral rights ensure an author’s right to protect his 
name in his work and control the integrity of his creative offspring from the 
presence of “bastard” reproductions or derivatives.
82
  For the most part, this 
moral right is described as the right to attribution, but in other instances, 
this right is explicitly referred to as the moral right of “paternity” in one’s 
work.
83
  The paternalistic conception of the author is just as prevalent today 
as it was when copyrights first began. 
Modern copyright laws also perpetuate the conception of the author as 
God, a characterization readily seen in the extensive list of powerful and 
long-lasting rights that rest on the author of a creative work.  The tight rein 
an author exercises over his work is virtually all-encompassing and 
practically endless in its scope.  Under modern copyright law, the author 
possesses exclusive control over the distribution and consumption of his 
work: he essentially controls when, how, where, and by whom his work is 
disseminated, copied, performed, broadcast, reproduced, or displayed.
84
  He 
also exercises exclusive control over future works that are birthed from the 
original creation, such as derivatives and adaptations.
85
  Thus, not only 
                                                          
 80.  C.P.I. art. L113-1 (Fr.) (translated by author). 
 81.  Wright, supra note 2, at 79. 
 82.  See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (“[T]he author of a work of visual art . . . 
shall have the right . . . to claim authorship of that work.”); Copyright, Designs, and 
Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 77(1) (U.K.) (“The author . . . has the right to be identified 
as the author or director of the work.”); C.P.I. art. L121-1 (Fr.) (“The author enjoys the 
right to have his name, his caliber, and his work respected. This right is attached to his 
identity as a person.”) (translated by author); Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s 193 (Austl.) 
(“The author of a work has a right of attribution of authorship in respect of the work.”). 
 83.  Wright, supra note 2, at 79. 
 84.  See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (providing authors the right to reproduce, prepare 
derivative works, distribute copies, and publicly perform and display copyrighted 
works); Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 16 (U.K.) (providing 
authors the right to copy; issue copies; publicly perform, show, or play; broadcast; and 
make adaptations of copyrighted works); C.P.I. arts. L121-1 to L121-9, L122-1 to 
L122-12 (Fr.) (providing authors the right to reproduce, publish, perform, distribute, 
transmit, and attach their names to copyrighted works) (translated by author); 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s 31 (Austl.) (providing authors the right to reproduce, 
publish, perform, communicate, and make adaptations of copyrighted works). 
 85.  Wright, supra note 2, at 79. 
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does the author’s primary work fall under his purview, but the work of 
others that originated from his work often does as well.  Furthermore, 
modern copyright law takes the exclusive and god-like rights of the author 
even further than what they were in the past, extending their terms to 
periods far beyond the author’s lifetime.  Whereas England’s original 
copyright statute only provided limited protection to an author to control 
the printing and reproduction of his text for a period of fourteen to twenty-
one years,
86
 current copyright law extends to periods from fifty to seventy 
years after the author’s death.
87
  These extensive rights, both in scope and 
duration, perpetuate the characteristic of the author as a god-like figure 
with overwhelming power over the birth and future of his creation. 
With modern copyright law continuing to view the author/creator as an 
autonomous, patriarchal, god-like figure, the protections it provides contain 
distinct holes that fail to include the cultural creations of several minority 
groups.  For one, indigenous peoples like the Ami,
88
 for whom oral 
traditions form the basis of their cultural creation, do not fall readily into a 
legal landscape predicated on protecting an individual, patriarchal, god-like 
author.  In many indigenous groups, cultural creation is a shared activity, 
facilitated through oral transmission of stories, myths, ideas, and important 
cultural knowledge.
89
  Each person contributes to the communal work and 
passes it on so that the next person may add their contribution to the mix.  
What results at any given moment is a cultural creation that never belongs 
to any one individual but is shared across the entire community.
90
  In fact, 
the only true “owners” of the cultural product are often the deities 
worshipped by the group.  These deities provide the people with the 
inspiration for their songs, stories, designs, rituals, etc., and the people in 
turn dedicate the resulting cultural products to the deities in gratitude.
91
  No 
one person can claim ownership of or control over a work that is originally 
viewed as a gift to the entire community.  With such a focus on creation 
                                                          
 86.  Statute of Anne, supra note 3. 
 87.  See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (providing copyright protection for seventy years 
after an author’s death for works created on or before January 1, 1978); Council 
Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993, Harmonizing the Term of Protection of 
Copyright and Certain Related Rights, art. 1.1, OFFICIAL J. OF EUR. CMTY. No. L 290/ 9 
(1993) (requiring copyright protection in European Community Member States to 
extend for seventy years after an author’s death); Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 
1988, c. 48, § 12 (U.K.) (providing copyright protection for fifty years after an author’s 
death). 
 88.  See Riley, supra note 56, at 175-77.  
 89.  Id. at 189-91. 
 90.  Id. at 191. 
 91.  See id. (“In indigenous societies, many members believe that ceremonies, 
music, and stories are communicated to the tribe by the Creator.”). 
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that extends beyond the control of the individual, there is no place for a 
modern copyright regime that is predicated on protecting the extensive and 
exclusive rights of a clearly identified individual author. 
Another area of exclusion that results from modern copyright law’s 
focus on the autonomous Romantic author lies in the inequitable protection 
of Black music under copyright law.  Like indigenous cultural products, 
Black music carries a strong tradition of communal development and open 
sharing as part of the cultural creative process.  Born from the oral customs 
of pan-African traditions that favor a group development and dissemination 
of cultural heritage and folklore, Black music relies on a deeply iterative 
process of creation and re-creation within the community.
92
  Blues, jazz, 
hip-hop, and rhythm-and-blues all arise out of a creative process that 
hinges on the sharing of creative elements and styles.  Through the practice 
of “sampling,” Black musicians often incorporate elements or entire 
excerpts of other musicians’ work into their own music, at times doing so 
without first obtaining permission.
93
  While this is a common facet of the 
creative process for many Black musicians, it is a practice that would 
amount to infringement under the tenets of modern copyright law.  The 
owner of an original work
94
 controls all aspects of that work and holds the 
exclusive right to reproduce, disseminate, and create derivative versions of 
the work.
95
  Under copyright law, sampling without permission is unlawful, 
whereas in the cultural context of Black music, it is a natural part of 
creation.  Regarding the development of funk music during the 1960s and 
1970s, one Black musical artist noted, “We sampled from people who 
sampled from us . . . . It wasn’t stealing.  That’s how music was made. 
Everyone sampled from everyone else.”
96
  Nevertheless, the restrictive 
rules of modern copyright laws have had, and continue to have, a confining 
effect on the development of Black music, as more and more artists choose 
to forgo widespread sampling as a form of creative cultural expression in 
fear of legal reprisal.
97
  In this way, modern copyright law, with its focus 
on the individual, all-controlling author, delegitimizes the creative process 
                                                          
 92.  MCLEOD, supra note 16, at 75, 77. 
 93.  Id. at 77. 
 94.  This “owner” is often, though not always, the creator of the work, particularly 
in the realm of musical recordings. Oftentimes, recording labels own the copyright to 
the work created by their artists. 
 95.  Wright, supra note 2, at 79. 
 96.  Interview: Paul Holdengräber with George Clinton, FUNKADELIC, (Oct. 29, 
2014), http://www.nypl.org/events/programs/2014/10/29/george-clinton-paul-
holdengräber. 
 97.  See MCLEOD, supra note 16, at 94-95 (discussing the chilling effect copyright 
law has had on sampling in hip-hop music). 
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for a minority cultural form, such as Black music. 
One final way in which the Romantic author-centric nature of modern 
copyright law functions to exclude minority cultural creation is in its effect 
on GLBTQ culture.  Unlike ethnic cultural products, queer culture is 
generally not developed and passed down through a hierarchical familial 
system.  It is usually not a culture of patriarchal patrimony, flowing from 
father to son.  As scholar Marvin Taylor notes, “Gay culture is a culture of 
aunts and uncles.”
98
  Cultural products from the GLBTQ community must 
be transferred laterally, rather than hierarchically, to persist and thrive.  
Under current copyright law, with such a firm emphasis on the author as 
father and supreme creator, such freedom of cultural sharing becomes 
stunted.  When the protection afforded cultural production requires 
extensive permissions for works to be shared, further developed, or fully 
enjoyed, a chilling effect on the growth and spread of the underlying 
culture arises.  This chilling effect is not of as much concern to more so-
called mainstream forms of cultural production, but for cultural works that 
arise from minority groups, such as the queer community, such an effect 
can be overly constrictive. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Examining the historical justifications for copyright law unveils a 
number of underlying principles that have guided the birth and 
development of property ownership over cultural works.  In particular, 
copyright of the past and today betrays a focus on the development and 
protection of the published, written word, created by an autonomous and 
all-powerful male author.  With the protection of cultural production 
manifesting such a distinct value system, cultural creativity becomes 
confined to that which falls under the auspices of the written work of the 
Romantic author-hero.  Works that exist outside of this prescribed area of 
valued cultural production are either not protected at all—as is the case 
with many traditionally feminine forms of cultural production—or are 
protected in such a way that threatens their very existence—as is the case 
with Black music and queer cultural works.  A critical examination of the 
value principles underlying modern copyright laws naturally leads to a 
challenge of those principles and the constraining effect they have on 
cultural posterity.  Historical principles and biases must be challenged and, 
in some cases, rejected in favor of more equitable insights. As Halbert 
notes, “[T]here would ultimately have to be changes in the law that would 
                                                          
 98.  Marvin Taylor, Director, Fales Library and Special Collection, Presentation at 
the 45th Annual Meeting of the International Association of Labour History Institutions 
(Oct. 3, 2014) (on file with author). 
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reflect changes in the underlying social structure.”
99
  Copyright law needs 
to be made more equitable, both in its coverage and its application, to 
ensure that a broader, more accurate version of cultural reality is preserved 
for future generations. 
 
                                                          
 99.  Halbert, supra note 13, at 460. 
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